Category Archives: Economics

Macron’s arrival was intended to save the EURO. But let’s review why money isn’t understood

Macron, backed by the German liberal empire, has taken over France to save the Euro by imposing austerity and changing French labour laws (whether he can do that remains to be seen). In 2013 we were reminded by Victoria Chick at a Positive Money conference that the Quantity Theory of Money as revived by Friedman’s ‘… monetarism’ was the basis of the construction of Euro,… and this determines the way the ECB is doomed to function’. ‘Can’t be very good then can it?…’, added Chick as an aside.

But it’s the way bankers ‘see’ money – as a ‘quantity’, or ‘commodity’, or ‘balance’ if you like, which requires debt deflation (austerity) to increase the value of money assets, wilfully forgetting that it is – in double entry bookkeeping terms – at the same time a debt, and that it is in the interest of debtors to inflate. Brexiting Britain is in fact going in that direction by intentionally devaluing sterling. But, going back to basics, money is almost always in origin a debt (or loan) which the debtor (or borrower) recycles through  the banking system via the ‘deposits’ of other recipients and suppliers, to provide the wealth of the financial system.

Hyperinflation is bad, like anything extreme is bad. Even Keynes (in 1919 in The Economic Consequences of the Peace) told us that monetary depreciation is a sure ‘means of overturning the existing basis of society’. Monetary depreciation happens if inflation gets out of control. But central banks continually push out the shibboleth that inflation is an unambiguous cost, borne equally by all members of society, and they see their role as minimising (rather than optimising) this cost. However, it is clear that on balance moderate inflation is good and creates wealth, where deflation and austerity merely maintains wealth that has already been created.

That’s the problem that France and the Southern belt of European countries face as financial neo-colonies of Germany.

Stock Share Buybacks Now Bought Out — American Enterprise in Decline

Research from no other place than Wall Street, itself, indicates that almost all of the returns since 2009 have been due to stock share buybacks!

Liz Ann Sonders, chief investment strategist and perma-bull at Charles Schwab, recently acknowledged that “… there has not been a dollar added to the U.S. stock market since the end of the financial crisis by retail investors and pension funds….” Since every buyer has a seller (and vice versa), what group or groups had enough of a buying presence to push the S&P 500 14.2% off of the February closing lows? Corporations. (Seeking Alpha <http://seekingalpha.com/article/3968290-stock-buyback-conundrum-will-companies-keep-much-longer>)

Most people assume what has kept the market afloat this year after sinking 11% at the start of the year was a mixture of better news out of China, oil prices stabilizing, and indications that the Fed won’t raise rates as much as thought. But the real thing bouying the market could be something else: Stock buybacks…. The stock buybacks come at a time when major investors including individuals, foreign investors, and pension funds have been selling off their shares, according to a note from Goldman Sachs, amid market volatility and weak oil prices. (Fortune <http://fortune.com/2016/04/25/buybacks-stock-market/>)

Over the past five weeks, the value of shares bought back has fallen 42% (yoy). The number of scheduled buybacks has fallen off substantially this year (35% below last year’s pace). So, we can anticipate the market will lose some of the hot air that once kept it aloft. Buybacks aren’t yielding the returns they once were, and the corporations have already taken on a load of debt for past buybacks that is even threatening the credit rating of some. Earnings have declined steadily as money spent on building for the future has dropped dramatically. It looks like the golden years when companies buy themselves are winding down, and we shall all convalesce together.

With so many American corporations convalescing, it’s a good thing we have Obamacare…

read the full article at

Stock Share Buybacks Now Bought Out — American Enterprise in Decline

 

The meaning of Angus Deaton’s 2015 Nobel Prize in Economics

Angus Deaton was awarded the Nobel ‘Memorial’ Prize in Economics this month. The prize was never funded in Alfred Nobel’s will. It was actually established on its 300th anniversary in 1968 by the Swedish Central Bank in honour of Nobel, and is simply awarded alongside the other Nobel prizes.

Deaton’s award is part of a tradition followed by the bank of rewarding heterodox as well as orthodox economists for their work, which began in 1974 with the honouring of Gunnar Myrdal, one of their own, leading light of the Stockholm School in the 1930s, and critic of the policies surrounding the Vietnam experience in Asian Drama.

Read on – click here:

Angus Deaton’s Nobel Prize in economics

Japan at the centre of the unfolding financial crash

Japan came out of a nuclear attack in WWII to become a massive economy, the third largest economy after the US and China, almost twice as large as Germany, and more than twice as large as either France or the UK. But since 1991 Japan has been in recession – called now the “lost twenty years” (失われた20年, Ushinawareta Nijūnen), where GDP and price levels have fallen and where the real wage has dropped. There has been a net population loss due to falling birth rates and almost no net immigration (despite one of the highest life expectancies in the world (81.25 years): so the country is growing old.

The lack of direction and vision in Japanese society is almost frightening: a cultural malaise has seized the nation almost like a nasty viral infection. Young people in Japan are, it seems, no longer in having sex: it is too “Mendokusai”  which translates as “too troublesome” or “I can’t be bothered”, where romantic commitment represents burden and drudgery. This is related to the economic condition of the country in the sense of reflecting an attitude to the exorbitant costs of buying property in Japan and to the uncertain expectations from a potential spouse and the in-laws that come with the spouse. According to the Japanese population institute, women in their early 20s today have a one-in-four chance of never marrying and their chances of remaining childless are even higher at almost 40%. What is shocking about all this is that no-one is concerned. A detailed analysis of this malaise is to be found on:

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/20/young-people-japan-stopped-having-sex

Add to this depressing picture the results of the Fukushima catastrophe, a cataclysm caused not so much by the natural disaster that triggered it, but by the incredibly bad planning that led the Japanese bureaucracy to build nuclear power stations on earthquake fault lines, and by the now surprising lack of technical prowess, previously strongly associated with Japanese industry, which became clear in the blind trust the Japanese seemed to have in US General Electric designs and their inability either to understand these designs for themselves or to incorporate their own safety or back-up mechanisms into the construction and development. The unravelling cover-up since the initial disaster is only partly a political damage limitation exercise, and mostly sheer lack of an engineering grasp of nuclear power.

Estimates of the total economic loss from this range from $250-$500 billion. See:

http://www.energymatters.com.au/index.php?main_page=news_article&article_id=1919

and

http://www.psr.org/environment-and-health/environmental-health-policy-institute/responses/costs-and-consequences-of-fukushima.html

The Fukushima disaster represents the largest discharge of radioactive material into the ocean in history, which for a country so dependent on fishing is a catastrophe of unprecedented proportions. See:

http://www.irsn.fr/FR/Actualites_presse/Actualites/Documents/IRSN-NI-Impact_accident_Fukushima_sur_milieu_marin_26102011.pdf

All this has lead to the panicky politics of Shinzō Abe which involves a new militarism expressing the country’s malaise and its social and political bankruptcy, as well as quantitative easing on an almost cosmic scale to try and restart a totally moribund economy.

The problem in Japan has always been the lack of flexibility of its society: in fact the whole Fukushima disaster is down to the “untouchable” élitist status of the Nuclear industry represented by TEPCO – the Fukushima operator and holding company for all of Japan’s nuclear power plants. Their ‘untouchability” has in fact led to innumerable cover-ups over the course of the recent disaster, which leaves no doubt that things must be much worse than has been reported, and costs probably much higher than even the worse estimates we have.

So a major part of the Western economic system has terminally failed is being propped up by the rest of the system, while beginning to drag it down. How did we get here? How have we come to have such a disastrous economic situation which seems to have impacted society to the extent of even negatively affecting the younger generation’s normal drives and values.

From the government led 30-year drive to rebuild the Japanese economy from the complete devastation of WWII until 1980, the country public debt had reached only 50% of GDP by the end of that period.  By contrast, today’s public debt in Japan is 250% of GDP, a figure “off-the-charts” relative to all other large developed economies, unparalleled in history, and generated by massive deficit spending, followed by its modern cousin, quantitative easing.

These outcomes have to be viewed from the perspective that Japan’s post-war miracle was never the miracle it was claimed to be at all: in fact the Japanese economy rebounded from the ashes of WWII for three decades due only to massive public and private investment, depending on high household savings, and a rigid mercantilist industrial development and export promotion policy, depending on blatantly protectionist policies that kept imports out and the yen’s exchange rate far below its true economic value.

As David Stockman explains on:

http://wolfstreet.com/2014/08/17/japans-fiscal-demise-a-cautionary-tale-for-our-times/

Neither of these aspects was sustainable, leading to a capital goods and export sectors which were enormously over-built, and the double-digit growth in fixed asset investment which had powered Japan’s post-war GDP growth was inevitably destined for a sharp fall. A counter-protectionist reaction in Washington would bring this to an end, such that the drastically undervalued yen creating the country’s export surpluses was going to be reversed. When we think that the US has had exactly the same problem with China from the mid-1990s until now, and that the US administration has tried to force a revaluation of the Renmimbi (the “people’s currency”) of which the Yuan is the basic unit, and failed, we have to remember that Japan, unlike China, was conquered nation. Its bureaucratic élite, that same élite which swore by General Electric nuclear power technology and had made it an “untouchable” sacred cow of the Japanese system, that élite which was usually Ivy League-educated, made Japan – although in geographical terms as “Far-Eastern” as China was – an integral part of the “Western” economic system.

It was James Baker who led the Washington backlash and structured the Plaza Accords of September 1985 which Japan ended up signing. This led to buying programme for the Yen which drove Japan’s exchange rate from about 260 per dollar to 130 over the next few years. But this was not accompanied by any reform to the economy.

Instead, the Bank of Japan began to fund a deficit spending programme in response to these changes by slashing interest rates in early 1986, and this despite the fact that the economy had excess capacity in the capital goods sector, across all of steel, auto manufacturers, machinery, consumer electronics and so-on, as a result of the post-war boom. What Japan had actually needed at the time was higher rather than lower interest rates, in order to alter this chronic over-investment in export capacity.

All the easy money thus produced had to flow somewhere and it flowed into the financial sector, creating a massive bubble in real estate and corporate stocks and bonds. This “financialisation” of the economy led to businesses drastically expanding borrowing in the form of both straight and convertible debt, all of which went into speculation in real estate and financial assets – especially into the stock of other companies within the Keiretsu groups around which Japan’s state-led development model had been organized, artificially driving up stock prices.

The Nikkei index of the Japanese stock market rose fourfold during the 50 months after the Plaza Accord, while the price of land rose to insane levels, rising fivefold before the major crash of 1991 (at which point point the aggregate value of Tokyo real estate exceeded that of the US as a whole). Meanwhile there was a drop in the growth capacity of the real economy due to the now more realistic exchange rate and the end of the fixed-investment boom. The excess capacity of the export economy was faced with fierce competition now in foreign markets, and the bureaucratic élite, together with the ruling LDP political party, now sought through these new policies described above to “featherbed” their corporate constituencies: but this wasn’t just easy-money, there was also a thoroughgoing rigging of the domestic markets and outright protectionism. Construction deals, new credit, and corruption spread among these constituencies, leading to overbuilding and white elephant projects.

So in the two decades after 1990, Japan’s government expenditures rose by 45%, while its general revenues fell by 15-20% opening up a massive fiscal deficit that fueled the parabolic rise of debt as we saw above, leading to credit saturation which itself has led to low or negative growth ever since. Furthermore, bad economic advice from abroad led the Ivy League-educated Japanese élites to dismantle the government tax base in order to try and generate supply-side effects, with even worse results – leading to a drop in government nominal revenues over two decades, in amounts unparalleled in history.

The lethal combination of easy money and lax fiscal policy has now also been at the core of
Shinzō Abe’s “Abenomics”, encouraged by ex-US Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke who pushed the myth that Japan was experiencing “deflation” (rather than structural overcapacity) and who recommend on this basis that the central bank run its printing presses continuously and blindly until inflation rise back to 2%—– supposedly thus reflating nominal GDP, aggregate demand, and the wheels of production and jobs growth in the real economy.

Thus Japan adopted “ZIRP” (Zero-interest-rate-policy) in 1999 and piled post-Keynesian central banking on top of an already hemorrhaging fiscal situation, leading to the explosion in the Bank of Japan’s balance sheet from about 10% of GDP to nearly 50% today. This resulted in massive financial repression, which not to put too fine a point on it, has been to no avail. During the approximate 15 years since it originally adopted ZIRP, Japan’s real GDP has limped along at 0.9% per year, not significantly different than the 0.7% rate it experienced in the previous post-1991 decade.

The obvious effect of ZIRP is the collapse of Japan’s previously vaunted household savings rate (which had funded its post-war capital expansion), now to below even US levels, something which will prove a trial for the large expected retirements looming up ahead, where even in the short-term Japan looks like it will quickly devour its savings. The country is on the road as David Stockman explains to “… becoming an international pauper”. The other unpleasant effect of ZIRP is that it seems to promise that government debts can continue to be financed at close to zero nominal carry cost for the indefinite future. Clearly any kind of “rate normalisation” is an impossibility, with the close to zero financing costs on Japan’s long-term bonds, since the sheer size of the debt has meant that the interest carry cost has still been consuming nearly one-third of its current revenues.

The attempt to exit this financial trap through the insane policies of “Abenomics”, trying to achieve a dare-devil “escape velocity” for the real economy have now shown to have totally failed. The spectre of inflation has indeed been created, but the real economy has collapsed even further. Despite the newly cheapened currency, and the consequent rise in imports, exports have hardly risen due to the policy of offshoring production to China, which in our “financialisation” environment has been  an integral part of the Japanese élite pandering to its corporate (keiretsu)constituencies, rather than seeking any kind of structural and social reform. There is no sense of national policy at all, a problem furthermore that we see across all “Western” economies anyway, where as Keynes said (see post below) “… enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation… “ but clearly reflected in a much more serious situation in Japan, than in the rest of the “Western” economic system, thus representing the leading end of decline into the abyss. See:

http://wolfstreet.com/2014/07/24/the-flame-out-of-abenomics-in-one-crucial-chart/

 

Keynes on the unfolding financial crash

Current predictions of the doom of financial assets are too numerous to quote, and numerous enough for anyone to find at least ten on a cursory surfing of the internet.

The history of financial cycles is as long as history itself, but we are coming up against the conditions for – in capitalist historical terms – a major one with a terminal end. Cycles/crashes have been part of complex webs of economic movement since the end of the Napoleonic wars, but since the end of WWII we have an entirely new dynamic arising out of the ashes of a cataclysmic experience of “slash and burn”.

We are coming up against the conditions thus for a terminal end to the period since the crisis of the 1970s and the resolution which has defined the period to 2008 – one therefore which will demand major social change – because only if the US can turn the government budget situation round dramatically can it build up the fire power it needs to keep the system going in the face of its lack of “fiscal autonomy” caused by accumulated deficits and large foreign holdings by foreigners. A “crash” has in fact already taken place in stages between 1998 and 2008, and it is principally the Fed that has come to the rescue to prop up the system by offering the refinancing for what Minsky calls the “Ponzi units” in the financial system, not allowing these units to go bankrupt in what would otherwise be a natural course of events. To understand why “big government” is ironically essential for the survival of financial “markets”, and why “expert” monetary and financial management inevitably involves the kicking of the can down the road in the form the refinancing of “Ponzi units” read: H. Minsky, The financial instability hypothesis: a clarification, in The Risk of Economic Crisis, (ed.) Martin Feldstein, Chicago; University of Chicago Press (1991), pp. 158-166

Furthermore, the insistence on propping the system up is causing massive skewing in the real economy, which we will be paying for in any number of ways over the next fifty years, from the propulsion forward of loss-makers like Amazon that destroy healthy small businesses everywhere, to encouraging irrational energy extraction like fracking, with its continuous and growing deficits, both par excellence examples of “Ponzi units”.  Thus ultimately the success of “big government” in floating the system against all odds, itself begins to undermine its crucial “fiscal autonomy”. As Keynes said in the General Theory:

“… Americans are apt to be unduly interested in discovering what average opinion believes average opinion to be; and this national weakness finds its nemesis in the stock market. It is rare one is told, for an American to invest, as many Englishmen still do, “for income”; and he will not readily purchase an investment except in the hope of capital appreciation. This is another way of saying that, when he purchases an investment, the American is attaching his hopes, not so much to its prospective yield, as to a favourable change in the conventional basis of valuation, i.e. that he is, in the above sense, a speculator. Speculators do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. But the position is serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation“.

See John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Macmillan & Co (1936), p. 159 [emphasis added]

Japan has, par excellence, represented the economy which – coming most spectacularly out of the “slash and burn” of WWII – has, since the 1980s, ceased to function, with a government which has buried its head in the sand by trying to prop up an untenable system. It is at the leading edge of the “terminal end” of our current system, with the last hurrah of the sheer insanity and desperation of what has come to be called the Abenomics of Japan’s Prime Minister since 2012, Shinzō Abe. Look out for a future post on this subject.

 

How the unravelling of Yugoslavia began with a Reagan Memo

Watch “the weight of chains” documentary about how the unravelling of Yugoslavia and the ensuing Yugoslav war and subsequent NATO bombing of Serbia all started with a memo written and signed by Ronald Reagan on March 19, 1984 called “National Security Decision Directive on US Policy towards Yugoslavia”, which at one point read “… US policy will be to promote the trend towards a market oriented Yugoslav economy…”

Open the link:

Unlike Egypt, the United Kingdom endorses Islamic securities

Middle East Monitor wrote on 28th June:

Debate has been renewed about “Islamic securities” following the decision by HM Treasury in London to issue “Sovereign Securities compliant with the Islamic principles in an unprecedented step outside the Islamic world that will bolster London’s position as an Islamic Finance base.” Many people have recalled the battle waged by President Mohamed Morsi when he was in office to pass a law regarding this matter. At the time, Al-Nour Party stood in the way while secularists launched a vicious war of words against the first elected president of Egypt, claiming that it would pose a threat to national security. They accused Morsi of beginning a process to sell the Suez Canal and Sinai through the sukuk (securities) scheme. This, of course, was proven to be a lie.

At the beginning of May 2013, Morsi ratified the Law of Sukuk. The first security was supposed to be issued after August 2013. However, the coup and the fears of those opposed to the scheme hindered the passing and enactment of the law. The Shura Council approved the draft law that organised the issuing of securities for the first time in Egypt after taking into consideration the observations made by the scholars at Al-Azhar University. The cabinet of Prime Minister Hisham Qandil also approved the Islamic Securities Law, although the name was changed to “The Law of Sukuk”, omitting the word “Islamic”. The government during Morsi’s time was preparing to issue the executive bill for the law and to form the committee of Islamic law experts whose responsibility would have been to supervise the process of issuing the securities. Qandil’s government had intended, at the time, to rely on the securities to fund several projects, including the development of the Suez Canal area. It also intended to compensate for the deficit in the budget through the securities scheme.

Under Morsi, the sukuk were highlighted as one of the significant Islamic finance tools that would attract investment funds. The government expected that the scheme would bring to Egypt $10 billion per year. Nevertheless, the post-coup provisional government claimed afterwards that the articles of the law that was ratified by the Qandil government would be a threat to national security, despite the fact that the project was explained in detail to the public. The media onslaught on the project never ceased, noted Rasd News Network, just as happened with the “smart cards” project for the distribution of petroleum projects, the IMF loan, the energy subsidy cards and the Suez Canal development.

Britain as a hub for Islamic Finance

HM Treasury announced that the government has bolstered Britain’s position as a Western hub for Islamic finance after becoming the first country outside the Islamic world to issue sovereign securities. “I hope that the success of this government issuance of securities will encourage the private sector in the United Kingdom,” said George Osborne, the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He added that the securities issue has enabled the treasury to raise £200 million.

A coup version of the sukuk project

The head of financial control in the Central Bank of Egypt, Sharif Sami, said in May that the final securities draft law had been referred to the bank for revision prior to submitting it to the cabinet for ratification in June. In press statements, Sami said that the law was subjected to some amendments so as to become consistent with the Egyptian finance market which is considered to be “the father of the law” of investment in Egypt. In March, Finance Minister Hani Qadri said that he would reopen the frozen file of the Islamic securities law in order to study it in a bid to diversify the means of government borrowing after the general domestic debt had exceeded 1.7 trillion Egyptian pounds ($245 billion) by the end of 2013. The former deputy prime minister and minister of international cooperation in the provisional cabinet praised the Islamic securities law that was issued during the time of President Morsi. He stressed that, despite some flaws, the law could contribute to attracting foreign investment.

What are Islamic sukuk?

Sukuk are monetary papers that are issued in accordance with Islamic regulations with guarantees from investment projects. They generate income and are fixed assets. These securities act like property ownership, lease shares or mortgages of project assets. Islamic securities allow those possessing them to take part in industrial, agricultural or service projects where they have the right to dispose of them by selling them on the securities market. They are subject to profit or loss dependent on the profitability of the project in which the securities’ holder participates.

The Islamic securities system exists in a number of countries around the world, notably in Malaysia, which alone issues 60 per cent of the total Islamic securities issued globally, estimated to be worth $200 billion. A number of other Arab and European countries also have such a scheme.

Egypt has seen a lot of debate over the past three years because of the attempt to pass a law that would regulate the issuing of securities for the first time in the country. Every time this was tried there were fears that state assets might be used as guarantees for the sovereign securities and that eventually they would be lost in cases of insolvency. Experts have said that Egypt needs to rush through the issuing of securities in order to fund the escalating deficit in the budget since the January 2011 revolution and in order to start new projects that may defuse public anger at the economic crisis

see https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/europe/12424-debate-reopens-in-egypt-after-london-endorses-islamic-securities

An international student call for pluralism in economics

It is not only the world economy that is in crisis. The teaching of economics is in crisis too, and this crisis has consequences far beyond the university walls. What is taught shapes the minds of the next generation of policymakers, and therefore shapes the societies we live in. We, 42 associations of economics students from 19 different countries, believe it is time to reconsider the way economics is taught. We are dissatisfied with the dramatic narrowing of the curriculum that has taken place over the last couple of decades. This lack of intellectual diversity does not only restrain education and research. It limits our ability to contend with the multidimensional challenges of the 21st century – from financial stability, to food security and climate change. The real world should be brought back into the classroom, as well as debate and a pluralism of theories and methods. This will help renew the discipline and ultimately create a space in which solutions to society’s problems can be generated.

see

http://www.isipe.net/open-letter/

. حسين حامد: “الصكوك” أنسب الأدوات المالية لمصر حاليًّا

أكد الخبير الاقتصادي الدكتور حسين حامد أن آلية صكوك التمويل ستكون بديلاً للقروض وستقلل من اعتماد مصر على الديون سواء الداخلية أو الخارجية، كما ستقلص من معدلات التضخم التي تنتج عن فقاعات الاقتصاد غير الحقيقي الذي لا يعتمد على الإنتاج، مؤكدًا عدم وجود مخاطر على الدولة من إصدارها لأنها لا تسمح بتملك الأجانب للأصول كما يروج البعض.

وقال حامد عضو مجلس الشورى المصري الحالي ورئيس الهيئة الشرعية للبنك الإسلامي للتنمية، خلال مشاركته فى ندوة “الصكوك.. وتساؤلات الشارع” التي نظمتها وكالة أنباء الشرق الأوسط اليوم، إن فكرة الصكوك مبنية على المشاركة في المخاطر والتكاليف واقتسام الأرباح، مشيرا إلى أن الصكوك هي أنسب الأدوات المالية لمصر في ظل ظروفها الحالية بعد تضاعف حجم الدين وأعباءه والعزوف عن الاستثمار المباشر.

وأوضح أن حجم عمليات التمويل الذي تمت تحت مظلة الصكوك في العالم بلغت 240 مليار دولار عام 2012، استفادت منها دولاً عربية وإسلامية وغير إسلامية، مشيرًا إلى أن حجم إصدارات صكوك التمويل فى دول الخليج وحدها بلغت 140 مليار دولار.

وأضاف حامد أن هناك دولا بنت اقتصادها على الصكوك، منها الإمارات التى طرحت صكا واحدا بقيمة 5ر7 مليار دولار لتنمية المنطقة الحرة في جبل علي، كما أصدرت طروحات بقيمة 20 مليار جنيه إسترليني لتمويل مشروعات وتوسعات شركة موانئ دبي التى أصبحت من أكبر الشركات فى العالم.

ورأى أن أدوات التمويل التقليدية مثل القروض والسندات وغيرها، أضرت بالاقتصاد العالمي وأدت إلى حدوث أزمات طاحنة انعكست بالسلب على كل بلدان العالم وفي مقدمتها الأزمة المالية العالمية عام 2008، مما دفع بالمؤسسات العالمية والدول الغربية إلى التوجه وبشدة إلى أدوات التمويل الإسلامي الأكثر أمانا، ومنها دول مثل (إنجلترا، وأمريكا، والصين، واليابان).

وأوضح الخبير الاقتصادي الدكتور حسين حامد أن نشاط التمويل الإسلامي بدأ منذ عقود طويلة من مصر عام 1968، لكنه ظهر بشكل أكبر فى الإمارات عام 1975 مع إنشاء بنك دبي الإسلامي، أعقبه إنشاء البنك الإسلامي للتنمية ثم انتشرت الظاهرة في بقية الدول العربية والإسلامية، كما أن بنوكا عالمية أنشات وحدات لديها للتمويل الإسلامي.

وقال إن الدول الغربية غير الإسلامية تسعى للاستفادة من الأدوات المالية الإسلامية دون النظر إلى دين أو عقيدة، ورغم ذلك نجد أن مثل هذه الأدوات تحارب فى دولنا العربية ومنها مصر دون أن تتم تجربتها التجربة الحقيقية.

وأضاف حامد أن التمويل التقليدي المبني على القروض يمنح المال ويترك المدين غارقا في ديونه، بينما في الصكوك لا يوجد دائن وإنما شريكًا في المشروع ولا يدير وهو أمر جيد لأية جهة مصدرة للصكوك، كما أن إصدار الصكوك لا تعني بالمرة التملك والقانون ذلك فى مواده وإلزام الجهات المصدرة برد أصل الصك بعد إنتهاء مدة إصداره.

وأوضح أن عمليات التمويل الإسلامي بدأت بمبالغ محدودة ومع نجاحها والتوسع فيها، اتسعت قاعدة التمويل الإسلامي لتصل إلى أكثر من 3ر1 تريليون دولار على مستوى العالم، حتى وصل الأمر بمؤسسات أجنبية غربية لإصدار صكوكًا إسلامية مثل “جولدن مان ساكس” ودولا مثل ألمانيا والصين وغيرها.