Category Archives: US Foreign Policy

The third act of the Iraqi Saga: Iraq coming together under Abadi

The final act of the Iraqi gambit launched  by G. W. Bush/A. Blair gambit to “reshape the Middle-East” is underway, and may have a surprising outcome. After the 2003 US invasion and subsequent withdrawal, the US proceeded to gradually reinstate itself in Northern Iraq (and Syria) through it alliance with the Kurds, in what is ostensibly a campaign against DAESH/ISIS, the spread of which, however, there is now ample documentation to prove, the US had earlier helped to promote as part of a strategy to destabilise and remove the Assad régime in Damascus, and sever the bridge between Iran and Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon.

The US had also helped the Iraqi army reorganise after its defeat in Mosul 2014, given that Daesh/ISIS was threatening the whole of Iraq at the time, and the Iraqi army would be necessary boots on the ground for a difficult campaign against a widely spread opponent. Ultimately, it was the reorganised Iraqi army, with a few US advisers, but nevertheless under Haidar el-Abadi’s leadership, that cut its teeth, and lost much blood, in retaking Mosul. Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi was, until now, veering towards an alliance with the US against the rigidly pro-Iranian sections (e.g. Nouri al-Maliki) of the Iraqi political scene.

All this was before KRG referendum on independence and Trump’s speech decertifying the  Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action  (JCPOA) P5+1+EU Iran Nuclear Deal, and his thinly veiled threats against the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Together these spelled a potential reigniting of US ambitions to sever the bridge now between Iran and Syria (Assad having survived) with a Kurdish entity under its aegis. Furthermore, with a Kurdish population in Iran, a KRG-US alliance could potentially provide the US with direct and effective lever to undermine the Iranian régime. It was hardly likely that Iran, with its deep involvement in Iraq, and its need to keep the direct link with Syria would stand idly by and allow that situation to be realised.

Abadi’s reliance on the US to bolster his own position will now melt away, as he will build on his reputation as the conqueror of Mosul. This requires his continued campaigning to keep control over the Iraqi army forces, which have now become the foundation of his rule. The Iraqi PMM militia (el-Hashd el-Shaabi) represents a potential competitor, supported directly by Iran’s IRGC, that he needs to keep on a tight leash in all future conflict. This he can only do by keeping it marginalised as a force secondary to his own.  Trump’s speech will have pushed the IRGC to increase its investment in the PMM hugely to ensure the KRG/Peshmerga’s defeat (besides the effect it is having in raising the IRGC’s stock within Iran) . The US will continue to supply Abadi, irrespective of what he does, because he is their only potentially ally in Baghdad, while Abadi himself will focus on his race against these various mounting pressures.

The KRG’s independence referendum presented a opportunity that answered Abadi’s political needs. The US can now only sit and watch as tensions mount between two of its allies. Trump’s speech made this outcome inevitable. Abadi is on the road to turning himself into a indispensable political force in Iraq as he commits to marginalising the KRG by retaking the Kirkuk oil fields and thus the major source of its revenue. This, it would appear, he has begun to do as the Peshmerga retreat from Kirkuk. The revenue itself is of little import to a government in Baghdad that produces ten times as much oil in its southern provinces. The whole point is to render the KRG’s independence gambit cashless.

Given that the Peshmerga forces that abandoned their positions in Kirkuk belong to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) faction, it would appear that a deal has been struck between Baghdad and the PUK to unseat Barzani and Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) in Irbil. Bafel Talabani, the son of PUK leader, the late Jalal Talabani, had opposed the referendum and had warned the Kurds were heading for disaster. Two large oil fields a bit further west of Kirkuk, Bai Hassan and Avana Dome, are as of writing, still under Kurdish management although the Peshmerga have now left. Temporary shutdown of oil production at the two field appears to have been reversed as the Iraqi government threatened to remove the management.

Kirkuk has been a bone of contention between Baghdad and the KDP Irbil since the very beginning of the functioning of the new Iraqi constitution. The Kurds had benefitted from US patronage ever since Bill Clinton’s no-fly zone. When the new constitution was written, the KRG was given special autonomy, but without Kirkuk which is only one-third Kurdish in demographic terms. However, it was KDP policy to change that situation by bussing Kurdish populations into Kirkuk, changing, in a phase made famous by the Israelis, “facts on the ground”. This led to bad relations with the Federal Government in Baghdad, whose leaders eventually stopped paying the KRG bureaucracy’s salaries. The referendum was only to go ahead because of the personal intervention of Kirkuk’s hawkish Kurdish governor, Najmeddin Karim. Now he has been stripped of all his powers.

What is helping Abadi to reach his goal is the fact that the US has managed to so undermine its relationship with Turkey, with its Kurdish alliances, that the Turks are now opening new direct border connections with Iraq that bypass its erstwhile KRG. This has led to the complete regional isolation of the KRG, given that Iran is also now effectively closing its own border points with the Kurdish enclave at Haji Omaran, Parwezkhan and Bashmaq. Thus under total siege, KRG’s president Masoud Barzani’s position is unenviable. Time and history is on Abadi’s side, and potentially a military triumph in Kirkuk will mean the survival of Iraq as a nation and its astonishing retreat from the brink of partition.

This will also give hope to Sunnis in Iraq, as a post-campaign consolidation of Abadi’s power vis-à-vis Iranian elements in Iraq, will require that he brings Sunnis under his political tent. This outcome would need to involve a rebalancing of the post-war sectarian régime in Baghdad with its lack of governing capability, but is likely to occur as a result of the new tripartite interaction between Turkey, Iran and Iraq at multiple economic, political and security levels and the need to satisfy the broad range of interests all this entails.

What is now abundantly clear is that the G. W. Bush/A. Blair gambit to “reshape the Middle-East” has failed, and since the beginning of the Astana process, regional powers are consolidating their hold on the region’s security, and sidelining the US. It is remarkable that, unlike Syria, which is now merely a de juro entity, Iraq looks like it will regain its sovereignty. The defeat of the KDP, will bring the KRG back as a player within the Baghdad political scene, while the clear need to include Sunnis in the process will likely be answered by Abadi, for his own political reasons, quite besides it being part of a regional settlement. It all may collapse again, but this is unlikely.

Muqtada al-Sadr’s various attacks on the Federal government over the past two years, has made it clear that there is a strong current in Shia politics in favour of an Iraqi nationalist stance, independent of Iran which Abadi can rely on, and which he can now invest in virtue of his new stature since in success in Mosul, and in Kirkuk (although this last success has something also to do with negotiations between the PUK/Talabani clan and the IRGC’s Qasim Suleimani that took place in Suleimaniya during the KRG’s referendum). A democratic federated Iraq may slowly be emerging, and the era of ethno-nationalisms fading.

 

 

The failed 2016 Turkish coup and the role of the US

The sign on the bus carrying participants to trials of those accused of organising the attempted 15th July 2016 coup reads; “We have not forgotten July 15, we will not let it be forgotten”.

On July 15th 2016, a military coup was hatched which included the attempted assassination of Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. It failed, and has since been the centre-piece of massive  investigation, arrests, and court proceedings. Fethullah Gülen, who resides permanently in the US in a compound in rural Pennsylvania, was without doubt the focal figure in this coup, which included hundreds of his followers in the organisation known in Turkey as FETÖ. Attempts to characterise the coup as fake and organised by the country’s government have foundered on the evidence. Requests for Gülen’s extradition have been met in the US justice system by total silence – neither acquiescence nor rejection based on evidence-based arguments.

This is despite the fact that the US has supplied documentation to Turkish authorities, which has allowed them to convict Kemal Batmaz as being one of the two leaders of the coup (along with fugitive Adil Öksüz). The document from US border security affirms visits by Kemal Batmaz to Fethullah Gülen in the US, which he had previously denied. It is now fairly obvious that this evidence is as damning of Gülen as  it is of Batmaz.

Now outgoing US Ambassador to Turkey, John Bass,  has caused problems for himself over his strong reaction to journalist reports that an unregistered US Istanbul Consulate staffer was a FETÖ operative. There has been tension between Turkish authorities and the US Embassy on the FETÖ debacle on a number of previous occasions. Before Adil Öksüz disappeared following his controversial and sudden release from custody arranged by FETÖ-linked judges , he received a call from an Istanbul telephone number registered to the U.S. Consulate. Upon being questioned on the matter, US authorities claimed he had been called merely to be told that his visa application had been canceled.

Secondly, FETÖ leaders Muharrem Gözüküçük and Bayram Andaç called the U.S. Embassy and the U.S. Consulate one day after the raid by FETÖ-linked officials on trucks belonging to the intelligence services (MİT) in March 2014, which were delivering aid and weapons to Turkmen tribes. This raid was a ploy orchestrated by Fethullah Gülen through former Adana prosecutor Özcan Şişman to implicate the Turkish government as a supplier of weapons to ISIS. Given the evidence from an August 2012 document that the US Defense Dept. was deeply involved in the plan to allow ISIS expansion into Syria in the first place, this was a clear attempt to shift blame onto the Turkish government, using friendly Turkish deep state elements in order to do so.

Furthermore, in respect of Turkey’s ongoing fight against the PKK, Hamza Uluçay, who worked at the U.S. Consulate in Adana for 36 years was charged six months ago with having close ties to the organisation, officially proscribed both in Turkey and the US.

Ambassador Bass says that the arrest now of US Istanbul Consulate staffer Metin Topuz is an outrage and on his view, ‘without merit’. Turkish authorities hold, however, that he actually does not exist on the list of accreditations with the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and therefore should not be on concern to the Ambassador. To add to the confusion, Topuz himself maintains he worked for the DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration), raising suspicions of CIA links. He is charged with espionage and violating the constitutional order: “The suspect had phone contacts with 121 people investigated for links to FETÖ and contacted people using ByLock hundreds of times,” the indictment reported by Anadolu Agency (AA) claims, referring to the encrypted messaging app used by the terrorist group.

Ambassador Bass’ reaction to the situation was to disaccredit a number of journalists reporting on these cases, preventing them from asking questions at his pre-departure press conference. Following that, the US suspended non-immigrant visa applications from Turkey. The sudden action, which appears to have backing at Foggy Bottom, occurred without any prior warning, and seems to be both an admission of guilt (“she both protest too much”), and an act that seems to be designed only to be solved by some kind of covert bargaining. However, in retaliation Turkish visa applications for US citizens have been suspended.

If State Department officials believe that this arm-twisting (essentially taking US – Turkish commercial activity hostage) will lead to the Turkish government rolling-over, they might well be mistaken. It is not merely that the Turks have so far been unmoved by any and all attacks over the roll-over of their state of emergency and accusation of human rights abuses associated with their arrests over the matter of the coup. More generally, in terms of the direction of world trade, “times have changed”, in case this hadn’t been noticed.

 

 

Trump walks into a trap designed by the UAE, but comes out with tons of money

Trump’s jamboree in Riyadh was intended as part of a US plan to ‘confront’ Iran. This certainly will be good for the stock prices of Northrop Grumman, Lockheed-Martin and Raytheon as Saudi Arabia, fresh from spinning its way out of responsibility for the 9/11 attacks in NY, piles up an unbelievable amount of weaponry, most of which it can’t possibly use. Nobody has told the Saudis that the Iranians have developed an asymmetrical style of warfare for the past 35 years, which has defeated all attempts by even the US to overcome it.

But from the Saudi point of view the $110bn arms (+ $220bn commercial) deal signed with Trump is nothing but a bribe to get the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA) repealed, to keep the US onside in the increasingly unpopular Yemen War, and to buy the US President’s acquiescence to the whims of Saudi foreign policy. This, Trump is quite happy to do for the money, being as it is in character for him to issue contradictory statements within minutes of each other, even if, in the case of the Saudi/UAE sanctions against Qatar, this stands in stark contrast to the Pentagon’s statements on the effectiveness of its alliance with the country and the importance of CENTCOM’s HQ there.

On the face of it Saudi and the UAE leaders came out of the Trump meeting feeling they had carte blanche to crush Qatar as part of the ‘anti-Iran’ front, because of Qatar’s friendly relations with Iran with whom it shares its most important asset, the South Pars/North Dome Gas Condensate field. The odd thing is that the UAE is actually itself one of Iran’s largest trading partners. Nevertheless, this doesn’t compare with the strategic importance of Qatar’s cooperation with Iran over LNG exports from the joint field and through the Straits of Hormuz. This lies at the centre of Qatar’s independent foreign policy which Saudi and the UAE view antagonistically.

Over the past four years the relationship Between Qatar and the UAE has been strained over Qatar’s independent stand against UAE leader Mohamed bin Zayed’s (MbZ) counterrevolutionary rampage across the Middle East.

The UAE media has developed and promulgated the meme that Qatar ‘supports terrorism’ which the help of neocon think-tanks such as the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), which are only too thankful for the new UAE largesse coming their way and for the attention they are getting, having been marginalised within the Washington Beltway after the advent of Trump.

In sum, Trump’s anti-Iranian project is being invested by MbZ, who has considerable personal influence on the ambitious and highly impetuous Mohamed bin Salman (MbS), son of the dementia-afflicted Saudi king, to further his personal goals. These have been understood to have always centered on the division of Saudi Arabia, and the integration of the Eastern Province into the UAE.  The fact that Qatar lies next to this area, and that its leadership is keenly aware of MbZ’s machinations, has made them traditional enemies.

Oddly, while MbZ’s previous involvement in a plot against King Salman, MbS’s father, during the last Saudi succession, is well known, all seems to have been forgotten from the Saudi government perspective since the UAE agreed to join MbS’s signature war in Yemen: a war which he would direct as effective Prime Minister and Defence Minister and which was supposed to catapult the young man over two generations of claimants onto the throne in short measure. This meant MbZ turning against the Houthi rebellion, which he had backed and funded against the Yemeni government led by the Muslim Brotherhood party, al-Islah, from the start.

The sudden sanctioning and cutting of relations with Qatar is clearly a step beyond the 2014 diplomatic row, and an invitation for a coup to take place in Qatar. But while UAE media claims that Qatar, among its ‘terrorist’ activities, is supporting the rebel Houthis in Yemen, it is well known that MbZ is actually host in Abu Dhabi to Ali Abdulla al-Saleh the ex-Yemeni president and chief backer of the Houthis to this day, and that his  support for the Houthis had never really ended. MbZ is playing both sides against the middle.

Meanwhile, Qatari soldiers are regularly reported killed, fighting the Houthis in support of Saudi Arabia. The Qatari Emir’s resistance to MbZ’s idea of a formal north/south division of Yemen was the most recent flashpoint between the two leaders. Called the ‘Aden Coup’ plot, the UAE leader was planning to control Aden, which would have then given him control of both sides of Bab el-Mandab, given his newly acquired military bases on the Horn of Africa, in the twilight zone of Somaliland.

There is no end to MbZ’s ambitions. He runs a police state in the UAE almost out of science fiction, which has followed a systematic counterrevolutionary policy against Muslim Brotherhood political parties throughout the region. Having funded the military coup in Egypt, he now controls Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi, and he followed that gambit with similar but less-successful ones in Libya and Tunisia. He was opposed to pro-Muslim Brotherhood and anti-Assad Qatari and Turkish policy in Syria, and backed Turkish coup plotters in July 2016 (recently confirmed in email leaks from the UAE Ambassador’s computer in Washington).

***

Russia’s announcement that it doesn’t care about this new row between Gulf States, in the face of contradictory US statements, reflects its new geostrategic strength in the Middle East region. If the Gulf states become an area of instability, this massively enhance Russia’s position as a reliable source of energy, and will boost its oil and gas exports. But a Saudi/UAE invasion of Qatar, given the failure of the expected coup, is highly unlikely given the open wound of the Yemen War. Such a move would also open up a direct front with Iran, which will respond aggressively in defence of what it will understand as a threat to the South Pars Field, exactly where CENTCOM HQ is located.

If MbS might be thinking of such a move, under the influence of MbZ, this would destabilise his position within the Saudi Royal Family, given that his signature war isn’t going that well. The Yemenis didn’t roll over like he expected. Furthermore, many powerful elements in Saudi society have close relations with the Qatari al-Thani family. The Saudi/UAE move against Qatar is unlikely to achieve it objectives, and an embarrassed retreat will be more than likely.

As it is, Qatari sources deny the UAE media reports of panic buying in the shops in Doha. The Prime Minister’s office announced that food supplies have been secured for the foreseeable future, despite the closure of the Saudi border. Indeed, on the evening following the Saudi/UAE gambit the Qatari Emir, Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, was filmed hosting iftar with Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Muslim Brotherhood scholar, as a guest. The message was clearly that he was unmoved.

After Javad Zarif’s hurried visit to Ankara, Erdoğan now deploys Turkish troops to its Qatar military base ahead of the relevant legislation which has also been fast-tracked, and also changes his tune to take a hard line against the Saudi position after earlier making more diplomatic statements. With Turkish and Iranian help, Qatar will easily ride this storm. Even if there is reconciliation with Saudi, the die are cast. Qatar will have moved further away from the GCC axis and strengthened it relationship not just with Turkey, but Iran. The future looks bleak for MbS and more generally for Saudi Arabia.

Also read David Hearst on this subject.

The Road after Mosul

Mosul post- DAESH risks becoming the new vortex of instability in the Middle East with Iranian, U.S. and Kurdish forces vying for control of the area. It will be interesting to see how Gen. Mattis can hope shape a new strategy in his visit to Baghdad. Likely as not, the U.S. will seek to use the marginalisation of the Sunni sector to increase its profile.

So far the Iraqi government has deliberately avoided agreeing to a formula which will empower the Sunni Arabs in Mosul in the post-DAESH era and it intends to restore the regime which was in place before the DAESH takeover in 2014. Iran will use its influence with Iraqi groups, especially with the followers of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, to restore Mosul’s pre-DAESH administrative regime. This will give Iran safe land access to Syria so as to complete its Shiite Crescent design for the Middle East. However, this plan will eventually clash with the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) desire to maintain its control in the newly gained territories in Mosul’s predominantly Kurdish districts. This Iranian-inspired policy in Mosul is also contrary to the Sunni Arabs’ plan for self-rule in the province, especially with the plan of the Mutahidoun bloc of Osama al-Nujaifi.

The issue of the participation of the Hashd al-Shabi (Popular Mobilization Units or PMU) was a serious complicating factor in the preparations for the battle for Mosul. While the U.S. and non-Shiite groups wanted to exclude the PMU from the Mosul operation, Iran and Iraqi Shiite groups within the government insisted on their participation. The PMUs maintain between 60,000 and 90,000 men under arms on a rotating basis. Indeed, the concept of al-Hashd al-Shaabi was launched not by the state but by a so-called al-wajib al-kifai fatwa issued in June 2014 by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq’s most influential Shiite leader. The Popular Mobilization Committee was headed by Jamal Jaafar Mohammad, better known by his nom de guerre Abu Mahdi al-Mohandis, a former Badr commander. Mohandis is now the right-hand man of Qasem Soleimani, head of the Quds Force, which is highly influential in shaping Iraq’s regional future.

The reaction to U.S. involvement in the Mosul operation by forces outside the Iraqi government has already made itself felt even under Obama. As soon as al-Abadi had agreed terms with Obama, al-Maliki launched the Islah (Reform) bloc to exert pressure not just on al-Abadi, but also on Kurds, and Sunni Arabs. In addition, Iranian backed militias made numerous threats against the U.S.. Qais Khazali, the leader of Asaeb Ahlul Haq, and Muqtada Sadr, the head of Sarayah Selam militias, stated that U.S. troops in Iraq are legitimate targets for attack. Militia commanders, including Hadi al- Ameri, who is the leader of the powerful Badr group, issued many statements openly defying the views shared by al-Abadi and the U.S. on the participation of the Hashd al-Shaabi in the Mosul operation.

It is very likely that there will also be further confrontations between the central government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) over the control of the disputed territories in the northern and eastern parts of the province. On July 30, 2016, Barzani had staked his claim: “Liberating Mosul is impossible without the Peshmerga”. He added that although the Peshmerga will take part in the operation, they would not enter the city of Mosul. It was then that he proposed that 50,000 Peshmerga would participate in the battle. Ultimately though only 10,000 Peshmerga turned up . Almost immediately (by August 25), there were acrimonious exchanges between al-Abadi and Kurdish leaders. Karim Nouri, a top commander of the Badr forces, demanded the total withdrawal of Kurds after the battle, while Shaikh Jafar, a political bureau member of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and top military commander, responded by categorically refusing to bow to this pressure.

It is expected that the Iraqi central government will emerge from the battle against DAESH victorious, thus gaining much military and political power on the ground in and around Mosul. If the past is any guide, the centralising character of this régime will determine events, with all the negative consequences that can be expected to ensue from this. The only factor that could possibly help this situation is the complex multi-level Turkish-Iranian relationship. This could bring a balance of interests between the Sunnis, Kurds and the Iraqi government. In fact, only in the context of a broad give-and-take between the two regional powers could the looming disputes over the control of Kirkuk’s oil resources be resolved without naked conflict.

However, the way the cards will fall will partly depend on whether the US (Gen Mattis) will seek to implement a palliative (strictly anti-ISIS/DAESH) or disruptive (anti-Russian) strategy. Judging from the navel-gazing going on in Washington, although the Pentagon will try to secure a ‘Sunnistan’ base for itself in the region, it will not be expansionist. Also, if the factors that are uniting regional players around the Astana process continue, despite its presence on the ground, the US will be marginalised.

Ignore the tough talk – Trump’s Iran policy will be much like Obama’s

 

Gareth Porter writes

The first public pronouncements by President Donald Trump’s administration on Iran have created the widespread impression that the US will adopt a much more aggressive posture towards the Islamic Republic than under Barack Obama’s presidency.

But despite the rather crude warnings to Tehran by now ex-national security adviser Michael Flynn and by Trump himself, the Iran policy that has begun to take shape in the administration’s first weeks looks quite similar to Obama’s.

The reason is that the Obama administration’s policy on Iran reflected the views of a national security team that adhered to an equally hardline stance as those of the Trump administration.

Flynn declared on 1 February that the Obama administration had “failed to respond adequately to Tehran’s malign actions” and suggested that things would be different under Trump. But that rhetoric was misleading, both with regard to the Obama administration’s policy toward Iran and on the options available to Trump going beyond that policy.  Read full article here

Rand Paul Vows to Block John Bolton as Deputy Secretary of State

Jason Ditz writes

President-elect Donald Trump is facing criticism for other nominations, but none may be so impactful as Sen. Rand Paul’s (R – KY) promise to oppose John Bolton’s nomination as Deputy Secretary of State, saying the ultrahawkish Bolton is “an automatic no.”

Paul expressed openness at Rex Tillerson as Secretary of State, saying he’s going to reserve judgement on him, but that Bolton “should get nowhere close to the State Department.” Read full article here.

Perhaps the Bolton proposal is a ploy by Trump to manoeuvre the Senate into endorsing Tillerson, while giving them a decoy to shoot down.

Trump wants to stop US régime change policies

Trump has laid out a US military policy which will avoid foreign interventions and instead focus purely on defeating DAESH/IS.

“We will stop racing to topple foreign regimes that we know nothing about, that we shouldn’t be involved with,” he said on Tuesday night in Fayetteville, North Carolina.

“Instead our focus must be on defeating terrorism and destroying Isis, and we will.”

Trump’s remarks came a few hours after Barack Obama delivered his final national security address of his presidency. Obama warned Trump to avoid overheated rhetoric in favour of a nuanced approach to the war on terror, and to avoid actions that could give false legitimacy to Isis as the “vanguard of a new world order”.

This from a president who sold more arms to the world than any previous US president, whose war of choice was Afghanistan, and whose avowed policy and that of his party since 2009 was to pursue régime change in Syria by proxy, only to pull back half-way, thus landing the country in an unfinished conflict which destroyed it completely.

Good riddance to the Nobel Peace Laureate Drone King and to the liberal internationalist imperialism of the Democratic party’s Progressive Policy Institute that spawned his policies.

Trump’s punch line: more generals and corporate CEOs

A retired general comes back to run Defense, if he gets the waiver from Congress to allow a military man into the post, which he probably will. Mattis believes Iran is dangerous. He also believes that Israeli policies are turning it into an apartheid state. He also said that he has never found torture to be useful, and that his preferred tools for getting answers are “a pack of cigarettes and a couple of beers.”

Another retired general, John Kelley, is picked to run the Department of Homeland Security. Kelly is apparently a liberal voice on the matter of undocumented immigration. So there seems to be some hope from the generals.

Luckily Oklahoma governor ‘drill-baby-drill’ Mary Fallin has been passed over for Interior secretary. Instead ex-Navy Seal Montana republican congressman Ryan Zinke has been chosen.

But Trump is also surrounding himself with CEOs to run the US, and its foreign policy. The appointment of Rex Tillerson, CEO of Exxon, confirms his insistence on a pro-Russian foreign policy stance.

If Trump’s cabinet is so far worth $14.5bn that’s largely because Wilbur Ross becomes secretary of commerce, Rod Rickets deputy secretary of commerce, Betsy De Vos secretary of education, and Linda MacMahon secretary of education.

The main worry is Oklahoma Attorney General Scott Pruitt who is going to run the Environmental Protection Agency. He threatens to erase much of President Barack Obama’s environmental agenda.

However, Zinke as a representative of the hunting and fishing lobby, holds out hope for protection of America’s wild spaces.

The Neocons are fighting hard to come back and control Trump’s foreign policy

There is a battle between the GOP foreign policy establishment and outsiders over who will sit on Trump’s national security team.

The fight pits hawks and neoconservatives who served in the former Bush administrations against those on the GOP foreign policy edges, who favour US retrenchment.

The sudden return of some Neocons into the fray (John Bolton in particular) is largely due to the influence that Robert and Rebekah Mercer seem to be wielding over Trump’s campaign.